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Are Clusters Races? ADiscussion of the Rhetorical
Appropriation of Rosenberg et al.’s “Genetic
Structure of Human Populations”
Melissa Wills∗
Noah Rosenberg et al.’s 2002 article “Genetic Structure of Human Populations” reported
that multivariate genomic analysis of a large cell line panel yielded reproducible groupings
(clusters) suggestive of individuals’ geographical origins. The paper has been repeatedly
cited as evidence that traditional notions of race have a biological basis, a claim its authors
do not make. Critics of this misinterpretation have often suggested that it follows from in-
terpreters’ personal biases skewing the reception of an objective piece of scientiﬁc writing. I
contend, however, that the article itself to some degree facilitates this misrepresentation. I
analyze in detail several verbal and visual features of the original article that may predispose
aspects of its racial interpretation; and, tracing the arguments of one philosopher and one
popular science writer, I show how these features are absorbed, transformed into arguments
for a biological basis of race, and re-attributed to the original. The essay demonstrates how
even slight ambiguities can enable the misappropriation of scientiﬁc writing, unintention-
ally undermining the authors’ stated circumspection on the relationship between cluster
and race.
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1 Introduction
In their paper “Genetic Structure of Human Populations,” published in Science in 2002, Noah
Rosenberg et al. reported that the software program structure was able to assign individuals from
diverse human populations into reproducible groupings based on their genotypes at hundreds of
loci and, further, that these clusters generally aligned with individuals’ regional and continental
origins. The article has been tremendously inﬂuential: it was the most-cited paper in Science in
its year and continues to feature in scientiﬁc, philosophical, and cultural debates ﬁfteen years
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later. Much of its treatment in the media has been controversial, with some interpreters describ-
ing the study as proof of a biological grounding for conventional notions of race, even though
the article’s report of clusters approximating the ﬁve continents traditionally identiﬁed as the
origins of the major races is not the only—or the primary—result of the study. The authors,
for their part, have declined to suggest any relationship between world-level clustering data and
social categories of race. The article itself never once uses the word “race,” with patterns referred
to only as “clusters,” “groups,” or “populations.” And it sidesteps discussions of race altogether,
considering the results only in terms of possible implications for epidemiology and evolutionary
history. Elsewhere, Rosenberg et al. (2005) have more explicitly denied any potential racial
implications of their research, specifying that it “should not be taken as evidence of our support
of any particular concept of ‘biological race’ ” (0668–9).
This essay, while assuming the authors to be neutral on matters of race, asks how a race-
oriented interpretation might arise from the article’s text and ﬁgures. I argue that the study is
presented with subtle linguistic and visual ambiguities that potentially predispose a reader to-
ward the very interpretation that the authors deny. I beginmy discussion in the following section
with a more detailed overview of the article’s ﬁgures and conclusions, before turning in section
3 to an assessment of its continuing currency in philosophical and popular science discourses
on race. The remaining sections analyze various facets of the paper’s visual and textual rhetoric.
Section 4 draws attention to its foregrounding of the world-level, continental clusters featuring
prominently in race debates. Section 5 shows how the text and ﬁgures promote an impression
of coherent, distinct clusters, and section 6 details the article’s reliance on a speciﬁc word choice
that suggests a particularly tight relationship between cluster and geography. Sections 4–6 work
closely with two particular misappropriations of the study, showing how they similarly seize and
transform each facet into supposed proof of the biological basis of race. Section 7 concludes the
essay with a reﬂection on scientiﬁc discourse and its cultural interpretations.
2 Study Overview
Before assessing the paper’s rhetoric, a brief overview of its methods and ﬁndings is warranted.
Rosenberg et al. (2002) conducted their study using the clustering algorithm structure, which
postulates population structures based on genotype data frommultiple individuals without prior
knowledge of their populations of origin.1 K, the number of clusters, is variable and user-
speciﬁed such that once K is set, allele frequencies across many loci are used to identify that
number of clusters and to deﬁne cluster memberships for individuals. An innovation of structure
was its ability to assign individuals partial cluster membership (given as membership coeﬃcients
summing to 1.0 across all clusters), enabling the recognition of admixture and a more ﬁne-
grained picture of population structure.
Rosenberg et al. applied structure to the HGDP-CEPH Human Genome Diversity Cell
Line Panel, drawn from 1,056 individuals from 52 distinct global populations.2 The analysis
was based on genotype data at 377 microsatellite loci, or noncoding regions of DNA character-
ized by short, repeating nucleotide motifs. The researchers found that membership coeﬃcient
patterns tended to be consistent across individuals within predeﬁned populations and further,
that inferred clusters agreed to some extent with geographical regions at both the world and
regional levels. The authors suggest that population structures are likely attributable to genetic
drift, with geographical or linguistic isolation driving genetic diﬀerentiation between groups.
1structure was developed by Pritchard et al. (2000) at Oxford.
2For details of the cell line panel, see Cann et al. (2002).
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Figure 1: From Rosenberg, Noah A., Jonathan K. Pritchard, James L. Weber, Howard M. Cann, Ken-
neth K. Kidd, Lev A. Zhivotovsky and Marcus W. Feldman. 2002. Genetic Structure of Human Popu-
lations. Science 298: 2381–2385. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
The evidence for these conclusions is presented chieﬂy in two brightly colored ﬁgures. In
each, structure’s results are visualized by assigning each cluster a diﬀerent color, with each indi-
vidual represented by a thin vertical line divided into colored segments proportional to inferred
membership coeﬃcients for the number of clusters being assessed.3 Individuals are grouped
with others of their population of origin and ordered according to their Cann et al. (2002) iden-
tiﬁcation numbers. Clusters, then, emerge as swatches of color spanning horizontal bands of
aggregated individual lines, concentrating in certain areas and diﬀusing in others.
Figure 1, reproduced here, visualizes world-level clustering patterns across all 1,056 individ-
uals for K values ranging from 2 through 6. Populations are placed according to continent of
origin, labeled with population names across the bottom and continental aﬃliations across the
top. The article points to Figure 1 to support its conclusions that clustering patterns are gen-
erally consistent within populations and that broader patterns of cluster membership generally
“correspond” to geographical divisions. At K=6, for instance, Africa appears predominantly
orange, America purple, and so on.
Figure 2, also reproduced here, displays further clustering results for the groups comprising
each major continent, with Eurasia additionally segmented into its component regions. K
values are more variable here, with the researchers including data for the highest values of K
yielding consistent results in each region. The article’s discussion describes in these results a
general consistency of membership coeﬃcients within populations as well as a tendency for
clusters to coincide with geographical regions.
Rosenberg et al. conclude the article by speculating on some possible mechanisms for the
patterns detected, speciﬁcally genetic drift resulting from historical migrations and linguistic
isolation. They also comment on potential applications of their ﬁndings in epidemiology and
medicine. The article ends with a reminder of the overall genetic similarity of human pop-
ulations, noting that “because most alleles are widespread, genetic diﬀerences among human
populations derive mainly from gradations in allele frequencies rather than from distinctive
‘diagnostic’ genotypes. Indeed, it was only in the accumulation of small allele-frequency diﬀer-
3The code used to generate Figures 1 and 2 was eventually adapted into the software programDistruct;
see Rosenberg (2007a, 2007b).
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Figure 2: From Rosenberg, Noah A., Jonathan K. Pritchard, James L. Weber, Howard M. Cann, Ken-
neth K. Kidd, Lev A. Zhivotovsky and Marcus W. Feldman. 2002. Genetic Structure of Human Popu-
lations. Science 298: 2381–2385. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
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ences across many loci that population structure was identiﬁed” (2384).
3 Context &Methods
3.1 Race Ontologies
As has been previously rehearsed in philosophy of science, diﬀerences in beliefs about the reality
of race can be sorted according to the types of ontological claims that they entail: realist, anti-
realist, or constructivist.4 The present article is not an eﬀort to develop an ontological account
of race as a biological or cultural concept; rather, it interrogates two distinct types of racial realist
claims. These claims can be distinguished according to the categories of racial realism delineated
by Kaplan and Winther (2014), two of which relate to biological categories: bio-genomic clus-
ter/racial realism, which claims that population structure exists in humans, as assessed through
genomic or anthropometric measures; and biological racial realism, which claims that groups
identiﬁed genomically or phenomically map stably onto social groups conventionally identiﬁed
as races (1040–1).5 As this section will demonstrate, Rosenberg et al. (2002) embodies the ﬁrst
of these stances, while two of its most contentious interpretations align far more radically with
the second stance. I contend in what follows that this shift, in which the study is exaggerated
and distorted into proof of a genetic basis for social categories of race, is mediated in part by its
own distinct verbal and visual features.
Rosenberg et al.’s article articulates a bio-genomic cluster/racial realist stance in expressing
a claim that human population structures exist among the individuals sampled and that these
are discernible through structure’s genomic analysis, while declining to suggest any relationship
between such structures and socially-deﬁned races. Whereas other population genetics studies
(e.g., Tang et al. 2005) speciﬁcally interrogate the relationship between genomically-identiﬁed
population structure and self-identiﬁed racial identity, Rosenberg et al.’s study neither tests nor
posits any such correspondence, noting only a “general agreement of genetic and predeﬁned
[geographical] populations” (2381). Their subsequent disavowals of racial signiﬁcance, as noted
above, aﬃrm Kaplan’s and Winther’s observation that “this kind of realism is not necessarily
about a ‘race’ concept … some inﬂuential and socially responsible population geneticists have
no desire to become involved in debates over race” (1040). To emphasize this discontinuity and
more accurately reﬂect the scope of the research study, in the remainder of this article I simplify
Kaplan’s and Winther’s term to bio-genomic cluster realism.6
The study’s refusal to engage with questions of race, however, does not prevent it from
being taken to be about race, as is done by the authors whose claims I detail below. I have se-
lected two writers whose work—in diﬀerent ﬁelds, for diﬀerent audiences, four years apart—has
sparked criticism for falsely representing Rosenberg et al. (2002) in attempting to substantiate
an altogether diﬀerent realist ontology. Both interpreters attribute an outsized inﬂuence to the
study, representing it as foundationally important to the recognition that races are biologically
grounded. Speciﬁcally, each writer asserts a biological racial realist stance, falsely claiming that
the study reveals an equivalence between clusters and the social groups identiﬁed as races (Ka-
plan andWinther 2014, 1040). In focusing on these two interpretations, I show howRosenberg
4Kaplan and Winther (2013, 2014) have revived these categories, drawing on Mills (1988).
5The third type, social racial realism, which defends race as a legitimate social category regardless of
biology, will not be discussed here (2014, 1041).
6Kaplan and Winther note that their term bio-genomic cluster/race realism includes a forward slash to
indicate that, while this kind of realism can put forth a race concept, it does not necessarily do so (2014,
n. 1).
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et al.’s paper has survived in a legacy that exceeds the disciplinary boundaries and realist ontology
within which it was written.
First is Neven Sesardic, whose (2010) article marshals a number of population genetics stud-
ies in an attempt to challenge what he sees as a dominant scientiﬁc consensus that race is a social
construction divorced from any biological reality. He describes Rosenberg et al. (2002) as a piv-
otal refutation of that consensus, heralding a decisive paradigm shift as “an important discovery
that makes it much more diﬃcult than before to claim that race is entirely disconnected from
genetics” (153). Sesardic’s hedged language here belies his audacious claim that the Rosenberg
et al. study singlehandedly demolishes constructivist arguments. He later writes derisively that
such authors should “make contact with the most recent exciting developments in genetics and
deal with the best contemporary attempts to rehabilitate the biological foundations of race”
(154). A later (2013) formulation is even more explicit, citing subsequent clustering analyses
that Sesardic claims amount to a “scientiﬁc validation of the race concept” (291).
Sesardic’s views have not gone unchallenged. Taylor (2011) has argued that his claims about
distinguishing genetic groups are insuﬃcient to rehabilitate a biological race concept; Hochman
(2013, 2016) has dismantled the logical inconsistencies in what he terms “one of the strongest
defences of racial naturalism in recent times” (2013, 278); and Pigliucci (2013) critiques Sesardic
on both scientiﬁc and philosophical grounds. I build from these analyses in my discussion below.
The study’s ﬁndings are recruited similarly in a more recent text, Wade’s (2014) popular
press book. Like Sesardic, Wade targets a perceived orthodoxy deﬁning race as a merely social
phenomenon, yet his biological racial realist stance goes beyond Sesardic’s in arguing pervasively
that the ongoing process of natural selection has conferred “not only expected traits like skin
color and nutritional metabolism but also some aspects of brain function” (4). The claim is
distinctly hereditarian and is provocatively justiﬁed in the book’s ﬁfth chapter, “The Genetics
of Race,” which grants the Rosenberg et al. study prime signiﬁcance as a foundational moment
in population genetics.7 Wade’s interpretation draws no distinction between cluster and race,
assuming a perfect mapping of the two from which the book’s later claims about racial heritage
and physiology devolve. His over-interpretation of this and similar studies claims that they
reveal racial implications that are absent from the originals.
Wade’s work has been extensively criticized. In addition to numerous individual responses,
a group of 143 scientists—including Rosenberg and several of his co-authors—signed a letter
to the editor of The New York Times condemning the book’s assertions and concluding that
“there is no support from the ﬁeld of population genetics for Wade’s conjectures” (Coop et
al. 2014).8 Criticism has abounded among nonspecialist writers as well. For instance, Orr’s
extensive and prominent (2014) review argues that the book “goes beyond reporting scientiﬁc
facts or accepted theories and ﬁndsWade championing bold ideas that fall outside any scientiﬁc
consensus.” Despite my critiques of certain aspects of Rosenberg et al.’s article below, I fully
concur with these criticisms, though my analysis is focused more narrowly on Wade’s abuse of
this one particular study.
Some critics have expressed concern that such misinterpretations of Rosenberg et al. (2002)
are prevalent. Bolnick suggests that the article has been “widely cited as verifying traditional
ideas about race and the pattern of human biological diversity” (2008, 74). Similarly, Templeton
writes that many authors referencing the article have “claimed that this paper supported the
idea that races were biologically meaningful in humans” (2013, 267). While neither Bolnick
7Hereditarian positions are a subset of biological racial realisms, in Kaplan’s and Winther’s classiﬁca-
tion (2014, 1041).
8Individual scientiﬁc responses have included Jobling (2014) and Feldman (2014), among many oth-
ers.
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nor Templeton fully substantiates this trend, and it is beyond the scope of this essay to conduct
a survey of such misrepresentations, their warnings underscore the importance of asking how
such a pattern might have arisen.9 My task below is to detail the work of misapprehension in
Sesardic and Wade, showing how certain features of the original article have been transformed
into evidence for claims that its authors have never made.
The racial interpretation as it appears in Sesardic andWade is driven by three central moves,
relating to the three key features of the original article discussed below. I deﬁne it as follows:
The racial interpretation of “Genetic Structure of Human Populations” (i) takes as the object
and primary result of the study the detection of ﬁve large clusters in the worldwide sample;
(ii) overemphasizes the uniformity and distinctiveness of clusters; and (iii) asserts a direct map-
ping between these clusters and the ﬁve traditionally identiﬁed continental races, implying that
clusters can serve as proxies for generalizations about skin color or other racial phenotypes.
3.2 Methodology and Critical Context
Defenders of Rosenberg et al. (2002) have often sought to correct the racial misinterpretation by
reemphasizing the aims and ﬁndings of the original article. Rebuttals have tended, for instance,
to reject the persistent equation of cluster and race by reiterating the study’s refusal to draw
this connection. Likewise, they have generally disputed the overemphasis on the detection of
ﬁve world-level clusters by clarifying that the study actually found a variable number of clusters
and is therefore less conclusive—“more cautious”—than it is made to appear (Templeton 2013,
267).10 Such errors are often attributed to the interpreters’ preexisting racial biases. Bolnick,
for example, writes that the ﬁve worldwide clusters have been so emphasized “simply because
they ﬁt the general notion in our society that continental groupings are biologically signiﬁcant.
This notion is a legacy of traditional racial thought and seems to persist even when not clearly
supported by biological data” (2008, 77).
While such rebuttals are vital in rejecting the racial interpretation, I challenge this tendency
to scrutinize the language and motives of the interpreters without considering their source ma-
terial. The inﬂuence of personal biases in the reporting of research relevant to the race debate
surely cannot be ignored; like the article’s defenders, I accept the researchers’ disavowal of racial
signiﬁcance and place the primary responsibility for the racial interpretation on the interpreters
themselves.11 However, to emphasize only errors of interpretation risks ceding too much au-
thority to the scientiﬁc work, blocking discussion of how these misappropriations might have
been prevented in the ﬁrst place. My primary aim is therefore to redirect attention to the article
itself, focusing on a number of rhetorical features that are directly imported into Sesardic’s and
Wade’s arguments and which to some degree enable its misrepresentation. These features are
verbal and visual, distinguishing my approach from those of authors who have critiqued the
study’s design or the nature of clustering methods more generally.12
9In sociology, Shiao et al. (2012) put the article to similar ends as Wade and Sesardic, in an argument
that draws on Sesardic (2010) and has been extensively challenged by Fujimura et al. (2014).
10Similar rebuttals include Bolnick (2008), Fujimura et al. (2014), and Pigliucci (2013).
11I distinguish this approach from critiques citing Rosenberg et al. (2002) as evidence of racially-biased
study design and/or more systemic bias in molecular genetics, e.g., Yudell (2014) and Duster (2003).
Because these critiques cite the article dismissively and without any detailed analysis—and because they
sometimes (as in Yudell) falsely represent the study as testing correspondence between cluster and race—I
sidestep them entirely.
12Scientiﬁc critiques of Rosenberg et al.’s methods, or clustering methods generally, have included
Serre and Pääbo (2004) and Templeton (2013), among others. Humanities and social science critiques
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My work in the remaining sections is grounded in the discipline of science rhetoric and thus
in the close analysis of scientiﬁc writing’s textual features. Building from classical predecessors
such as Bazerman’s (1988) study of the experimental research article and Myers’ (1990) anal-
ysis of scientiﬁc discourse across genres, I approach Rosenberg et al. (2002) with “the kind of
detailed attention usually reserved for literature” (Myers 1990, ix). I scrutinize signiﬁcant word
choices and phrasings, ﬁnding openings for the racial interpretation even in the sparse prose of
scientists who wish not to discuss race. My readings of Sesardic and Wade also examine the
one-step discursive shift—“accommodation” (Fahnestock 1993)—in which a scientiﬁc message
is reinterpreted for non-specialist audiences. My close-reading analysis demonstrates how the
article’s racial interpreters recruit and transform features of the original article in support of their
ideologies.
However, classical science rhetoric alone—which adheres almost exclusively to textual fea-
tures of argumentation—is insuﬃcient for analyzing the article at hand. The persuasive power
of Rosenberg et al. (2002) resides chieﬂy in its two ﬁgures, and so these too must be assessed
with rhetorical strategy in mind. Abundant interdisciplinary scholarship is devoted to scientiﬁc
visuals, their epistemic functions, design theory, and the cognitive processes of their apprehen-
sion. My work is informed by these approaches, but my primary objective is to show how
Rosenberg et al.’s images function argumentatively. There is extensive scholarly precedent for
considering scientiﬁc visuals within their social contexts, showing how they are adapted to suit
their creators’ varying theoretical commitments (e.g., Gannett and Griesemer 2004b), disci-
plinary conventions (e.g., Taylor and Blum 1991), and pedagogical aims (e.g., A. Gross 2012).
Gannett and Griesemer, for example, write of mapping practices that
Maps are abstractions that privilege some features of the world and ignore others.
Maps are perspectival—what gets included on a map and what gets left oﬀ of a
map depends on the aims, needs, interests, and conventions associated with speciﬁc
incidences of map-making. (2004b, 75)
I follow these approaches in my detailed visual analysis, taking the article’s ﬁgures to be con-
structed tomeet certain rhetorical requirements and asking how their speciﬁc construction—the
placement of labels, the ordering of boxes—creates particular impressions.
The analysis below is equally focused on the broader argumentative context to which these
ﬁgures belong, that is, their function within the article as a whole. Gross and Harmon (2014)
merge verbal and visual rhetorical analysis in a comprehensive account of scientiﬁc argumen-
tation, asserting that “understanding the images appearing within scientiﬁc texts involves not
only interpreting the meaning behind the pattern within a given visual, but also assimilating
that meaning into an argument or narrative” (46).13 I follow Gross and Harmon’s lead below,
considering the article’s ﬁgures as continuous with its textual argumentation in a uniﬁed persua-
sive task. I therefore consider its visual features alongside its verbal ones, moving from topic
to topic (the major subsections) and conducting both types of analysis within each to forge a
cohesive whole.
I wish to clarify before proceeding that my analysis, while critical, is not accusatory. The
rhetorical elements I discuss in Rosenberg et al. (2002) are assumed to be incidental, reﬂecting
the discourse of the race-charged society within which the article is embedded rather than in-
dicating any particular racial bias amongst the scientists. In contrast, I consider the hardline
racial interpretations of Sesardic and Wade to originate chieﬂy with these authors themselves.
have included Bolnick (2008) and Weiss and Fullerton (2005).
13Cambrosio et al. (2005) provides another account of verbal-visual interaction.
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My argument does not seek to blame the researchers but rather to demonstrate the diﬃculty of
presenting population genetics research in a way that fully defends against these interpretations,
particularly in the extremely space-limited format of a Science Report. In the work of these
two racially-motivated interpreters, even the smallest rhetorical features have been extracted,
misrepresented, and re-attributed to the original. It is through the ﬁne details of language and
image that the study becomes recast as something it never was.
4 WorldwideK=5Data as Primary
As noted above, the racial interpretation of Rosenberg et al. (2002) begins from point (i): taking
as the study’s objective and primary ﬁnding the detection of ﬁve large clusters in the worldwide
sample, when in fact the study identiﬁes a variable number. In this section, I discuss how the
article sets the precedent for this conclusion through a number of features subtly privileging
the world-level population data presented in Fig. 1—and the K=5 data in particular—over
its other ﬁndings. I focus my analysis on two primary sites, the abstract and the presentation
of worldwide clustering data, as well as a particular omission, and conclude by showing how
Sesardic and Wade propagate this emphasis on ﬁve worldwide clusters.
4.1 Abstract
As early as the abstract, the authors seem to identify ﬁve continental clusters as the primary ﬁnd-
ing of the study, observing that “we identiﬁed six main genetic clusters, ﬁve of which correspond
to major geographic regions, and subclusters that often correspond to individual populations”
(2381). Bolnick has noted the discrepancy between this statement’s mention of six clusters and
the more expansive analysis actually described within the paper (2008, 76). I would add that
in overtly identifying the six worldwide clusters of Figure 1 as the “main” clusters detected, the
statement further suggests that the regional population structures depicted in Figure 2 are sub-
sidiary. This impression is reinforced by the diﬀering degrees of certainty assigned to each: the
continental clusters are said to “correspond tomajor geographic regions,” while the regional clus-
ters only “often correspond” to individual populations. Admittedly, Figure 2’s lower-resolution
clustering patterns to some degree force this language, but the greater certainty verbally ac-
corded to the world-level data in the abstract seems to grant Figure 1 precedence. Moreover,
the primacy of the worldwide data is reinforced in the use of the word “subclusters” to refer to
the patterns distinguished in the regional analysis. This word choice suggests that the clusters
in Figure 2 are somehow derived from those identiﬁed in Figure 1—that they are reﬁnements
of the K=5/6 clusters—when in reality they reﬂect separate structure analysis performed on
subsets of individuals. Adjusting this terminology, perhaps replacing “subclusters” with “sub-
regional clusters” or “intra-regional clusters,” might have helped to prevent this ambiguity.14
With the worldwide data, the authors’ phrasing further implies a particular priority for the
K=5 over theK=6 data. The phrase quoted above mentions the detection of six clusters before
immediately distinguishing the ﬁve that correspond to major geographic regions, in what could
be seen as a dismissal of the sixth group (the Kalash population), refocusing the reader on the
unspeciﬁed alignment of clusters with continental origins. Any such implication is transient, as
the Kalash population is indeed addressed within the body of the paper. However, the point
bears mentioning here given thatWade and Sesardic ﬁxate so narrowly on theK=5, rather than
K=6 data. Since abstracts are taken, particularly by nonspecialist readers, to summarize major
14I thank an anonymous reviewer for formulating the ﬁrst of these alternatives.
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results, the various ambiguities I have identiﬁed in this one sentence bear perhaps a dispropor-
tionate signiﬁcance, especially as they are re-emphasized in other ways elsewhere in the article,
as I discuss below.
4.2 Figure 1
A second component that may unintentionally inﬂuence the perception of Rosenberg et al.’s
work as a study designed to test for ﬁve worldwide clusters is the conﬁguration of Figure 1.
The authors present data for K=2 through K=6 rather than selecting one as preferred, in
what has come to be a standard practice in such studies. Yet this neutrality is compromised
by the imposition of a labeling grid across the top of the ﬁgure, designating the continental
aﬃliation for each population group. My concern is not with the content of the grid (which
straightforwardly aﬃxes labels based on geography) but rather with the application of the labels
to the cluster distributions for all values of K; in this way, the ﬁgure implies a non-neutral
standard against which to judge structure runs at all values of K.
At K=2, for instance, there is a discrepancy between the two clusters represented and the
seven continents labeled:
The labels could be seen as encouraging the conclusion that K=2’s patterns of purple and
orange, which do not particularly align with the grid, are rather less valid than the better-aligned
higher values of K. An expert reader would likely be untroubled by such discrepancies, focus-
ing on large-scale geographic boundaries or human migration history to explain breaks between
clusters. However, for a nonspecialist reader the explicit inclusion of continental labels at all
values ofK may well—if unwittingly—direct attention toward the bottom two bands as a fulﬁl-
ment of predetermined groupings.15 Scanning downward through the increasing values of K,
the clusters gradually align more neatly with the labels such that at K=5 the reader need only
combine the three Eurasian regions (Europe, Middle East, and Central/South Asia) to observe
accordance with the overlay. Moreover, the labels could make it easier for a reader to discount
the appearance of the Kalash at K=6, since this group does not ﬁt within the labeling scheme.
A simple adjustment to the presentation of Figure 1, such as attaching the labels only to the
K=5 or K=6 data, while it still might have suggested an overly strong connection between
cluster and geography, might have reduced these possibilities.
4.3 Omission of Population Number Discussion
A third factor potentially inﬂuencing the racial interpretation is that the article declines to trans-
parently discuss the relationship between structure’s results at diﬀerent values of K.As described
below, Sesardic and Wade suggest that the main ﬁnding of the study was its identiﬁcation of
ﬁve worldwide clusters, despite the fact that the authors present no data and make no assertion
15The exclusion of data forK>6might further encourage the impression thatK=6 is the endpoint of
the analysis for world-level data. This aspect of ﬁgure design, however, is statistically valid and addressed
by the authors, who note that for higher K ’s structure sometimes produced multiple clustering schemes,
hence the decision to exclude these results and instead subdivide the sample into regional populations
(Figure 2) for ﬁner-grained analysis (S1).
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that any of the reported clustering patterns best reﬂects the actual number of human populations
present in the sample. At the same time, however, Rosenberg et al. oﬀer no guidance as to how
to interpret the various values ofK, an omission that in combination with the factors discussed
above may predispose the reader to overlook other aspects of the study.
There are legitimate reasons for avoiding claims as to the “best” value of K. As Rosen-
berg et al. note in their supplementary materials, one approach to inferring K would be to run
structure across numerous values ofK, then select the one maximizing the posterior probability
of the data (S1). They observe, however, that in complex data sets structure analysis can pro-
duce multiple clustering schemes and therefore diﬀerent estimated probabilities for a given K,
making comparison diﬃcult.16 In addition, the utility of structure’s statistical calculations has
itself been contentious from the outset. Pritchard et al. (2000), in introducing the algorithm’s
methodology, observed that “the problem of inferring the number of clusters, K, present in
a data set is notoriously diﬃcult,” involving “severe computational diﬃculties” and producing
only approximate values (949).17 Given these diﬃculties, Rosenberg et al. include results for
multiple values of K in parallel for each ﬁgure, with each horizontal bar reﬂecting the highest
probability run for that K. This presentation strategy prioritizes no particular K and conveys
no inferred population number. Bolnick suggests that this approach justiﬁes a wider view of
the article’s scope than is present in its more reductive interpretations, observing that theK=6
data “does not necessarily provide a better representation of human genetic diﬀerentiation than
the clustering observed when K is set to 4, 9, 12, or any other number” (2008, 76).
Yet even though the authors conscientiously decline to present claims or data concerning
the number of populations represented, these omissions are not addressed in the discussion. The
reader is given little direction as to how to compare results across multiple values ofK, or about
the relationship of K to actual human populations. While such guidance would likely not be
needed for an audience of population geneticists familiar with the underlying assumptions and
methods, for lay readers—particularly those motivated to look for evidence of a biological basis
of race—this oversight might well have unwanted side eﬀects. A brief discussion ofK ’s variable
status in the context of the study’s scope and limitations might have hindered, at least somewhat,
the racial interpretation from emerging.
4.4 Rhetorical Intensiﬁcation
The implication that Rosenberg et al. (2002)’s major ﬁnding was the appearance of ﬁve world-
wide clusters is foundational to the racial interpretation’s shift from bio-genomic cluster realism
to biological racial realism. Sesardic’s description of the study singles out the K=5 data, stat-
ing that structure “did allow an inference of group structure and that, furthermore, ﬁve clusters
derived from that analysis of purely genetic similarities correspond largely to major geographic
regions …. This is an important discovery” (2010, 153). The second half of his statement re-
produces the abstract almost verbatim, with a further reduction: whereas the abstract verbally
minimizes the sixth worldwide cluster, Sesardic neglects to mention it at all. He presents the
K=5 data as the sole ﬁnding of the study, and relies on unstated conventional associations
between race and geography to conclude that the study establishes a link between cluster and
16Evanno et al. (2005) have observed that structure’s method of using Pr(X|K) to diﬀerentiate be-
tween K ’s does not work well in practice. They propose an alternative statistical method for inferring
population number that seems to work better, but this method was not yet available to Rosenberg et al. in
2002.
17Pritchard et al. (2000) explain these diﬃculties in depth, as does Bolnick (2008) within a larger
context of ancestry inference studies including Rosenberg et al. (2002).
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race.18 Pigliucci has described this synopsis as “an exercise in selective quotation” because of its
exclusive focus on theK=5 data, asking “why pick a particular [number of clusters] as the major
ﬁnding of the paper, other than because ﬁve clusters happen to ﬁt the author’s predilection for
the true number of human races?” (2013, 273).
Wade similarly identiﬁes the worldwide K=5 as the study’s primary ﬁnding, though his
description is more charged. He writes with a tone of assured self-evidence that the study
“showed, as expected, that the 1,000 individuals … clustered naturally into ﬁve groups, corre-
sponding to the ﬁve continental races” (2014, 97–8). Like Sesardic, he appears to adopt the
formulation presented in the paper’s abstract in focusing on K=5 as the ﬁnding of interest, to
the exclusion of any other results. But whereas Sesardic remains more hedged throughout his
essay about the relationship between cluster and race, Wade is overt in asserting that those ﬁve
groups are—“naturally,” “as expected”—the same as the continental races.
Claims like these do not automatically follow from the paper itself, even though as I have
argued in this section it skews toward a privileging of this particular ﬁnding. Nevertheless, these
interpretations show how readily even the slightest prioritization of ﬁve clusters can be taken
to signify ﬁve biological races. One can see in retrospect just how little is needed to set oﬀ this
chain of interpretations, and thereby the need for abundant disclaimers as to the concreteness
of the results.
5 Cluster Uniformity and Distinctiveness
The second key component of the racial interpretation of “Genetic Structure of Human Pop-
ulations” is (ii): overemphasizing the uniformity and distinctiveness of clusters. This section
argues that the original article may subtly predispose this maneuver through the arrangement
and discussion of its two ﬁgures. I focus on the appearance of uniform clusters within popu-
lation groups in both ﬁgures and of sharp divisions between worldwide clusters in Figure 1. I
conclude by showing how Sesardic and Wade expand on these patterns.19
5.1 Population and Regional Uniformity
Rosenberg et al. repeatedly emphasize similarity in cluster membership within populations, re-
gions, and continents; for instance, they note that “in the worldwide sample, individuals from
the same predeﬁned population nearly always shared similar membership coeﬃcients in inferred
clusters” and that within populations they found “similar membership coeﬃcients for most in-
dividuals” (2382). General similarity is indeed a major conclusion of the study, aﬃrming that
population structure is detectable by the algorithm. I argue, however, that the paper occasionally
overemphasizes the uniformity of clusters, subtly de-emphasizing heterogeneity and unwittingly
encouraging a geographical determinism that feeds into the racial interpretation.
Despite the overall pattern of population and regional coherence, the article’s ﬁgures occa-
sionally reveal more diversity at close range than is ﬁrst apparent. For example, the African
Biaka Pygmy population in Figure 2 is largely colored red in what seems a distinction from
neighboring populations. Yet the group appears much more diverse when magniﬁed, with the
18Sesardic (2013) has widened his interpretation in response to Hochman (2013), no longer prioritiz-
ing any particular number of clusters; Hochman’s response (2016) notes this move is incompatible with
Sesardic’s account of racial naturalism (66).
19My approach is similar to Gannett’s and Griesemer’s analysis of human blood type frequency bar
graphs, in which the exaggeration of between-group diﬀerences and the minimization of within-group
diﬀerences are taken to imply a judgment of some kind (2004a, 134–5).
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prominent red coloration disrupted by a number of individuals bearing extensive membership
in the orange cluster, and lesser but visible membership in the blue and green clusters:
These secondary structures are easy to miss without zooming in, despite representing roughly
20% of the total area, and would likely be more visible if the lines were grouped according
to the pattern of cluster membership. While the placement of individuals within groups was
not determined by Rosenberg et al., the scattering of secondary patterns nevertheless has the
eﬀect of making the group appear more coherent—more essentially red—than it really is.20
That impression is not dispelled by the article’s text, in which the authors acknowledge that the
inferred African clusters “did not all correspond to predeﬁned groups” (2382) but decline to
discuss the non-correspondence further, in what might be seen as an overlooking of the genetic
complexity of this region. A superﬁcial reader might therefore overestimate the uniformity and
distinctiveness of this region, as illustrated in Wade’s misreading, discussed below.
America and Oceania provide additional examples. Both include populations with consider-
able secondary cluster membership, with the American Pimas showing patches of purple amidst
dominant green and the Oceanic Melanesians signiﬁcant purple within dominant blue.21
While the random ordering of lines in this case yields secondary patterns somewhat more co-
alesced than in the previous example, these are entirely overlooked in the discussion, where
Rosenberg et al. write that in these regions, “inferred clusters corresponded closely to prede-
ﬁned populations” (2382). The secondary patterns I reference here are minor and scarcely de-
rail the authors’ overall claims, particularly within Figure 2 as a whole, where most groups are
indeed strikingly uniform. Still, describing both America and Oceania as having close corre-
spondence between cluster and population encourages the reader to overlook the regions where
20Individuals were placed according to their CEPH-assigned identiﬁcation numbers (Cann et
al. 2002). See Rosenberg (2007a, 2007b) and the researchers’ readme (https://rosenberglab.
stanford.edu/data/rosenbergEtAl2002/diversityreadme.txt) and diversity (https://rosenberglab.stanford.
edu/data/rosenbergEtAl2002/diversitydata.stru) ﬁles.
21The choice of purple coloration for these two groups was selected independently; the commonality
does not signify genetic similarity across continents.
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non-correspondence occurs, potentially predisposing an essentializing linkage between cluster
and geography at the regional level.
Figure 1 generally fares better in this regard, given its greater overall regularity, but in certain
areas population heterogeneity still appears greater than is addressed in the text. The authors
write that “in the worldwide sample, individuals from the same predeﬁned population nearly
always shared similar membership coeﬃcients in inferred clusters” (2382). Overall this is true,
though the phrase “nearly always” implies somewhat greater similarity than the ﬁgures depict. In
the case ofMozabite and Bedouin populations of theMiddle East (Figure 1,K=6), both groups
demonstrate signiﬁcant orange membership in addition to the primary blue, with Mozabites
uniformly reﬂecting dual cluster membership, as at K=6:
Bedouin membership in orange is more sparse, and this weaker secondary pattern is dispersed—
as with the Biaka Pygmies—rather than aggregated. Each group thus appears dominantly blue,
especially when the ﬁgure is zoomed out, reinforcing an impression of overall coherence for the
blue cluster spanning Fig. 1. Such deviations are not discussed in the text.
That impression is strengthened in Table S2, which quantiﬁes relative cluster membership
for each region in the worldwide data. S2 registers a higher proportion of orange to blue for both
groups, compared to other groups in the Middle Eastern region and beyond. Yet their distinc-
tive properties are ﬂattened in the “Middle East” line below, which averages out discrepancies
between groups and establishes blue as the region’s dominant color.
Given that other regions are even more strongly associated with their dominant clusters (Africa
is 96% orange, Europe 97% blue), a hasty reader might take the table as conﬁrmation of an
essential parity between cluster and region, as an aﬃrmation that the Middle East is blue and
that its orange variations need not be regarded.
Admittedly, it would be impractical and methodologically unnecessary for the authors to
address every deviation from the study’s overall ﬁndings in such a short paper, particularly as
the results highlighted above do not detract substantively from their major conclusions. Yet the
authors might have more openly acknowledged variations within the overall pattern of cluster
membership and more assiduously avoided general statements of population uniformity. Such
maneuvers would never fully deter racial interpreters but might have somewhat complicated
their claims, which are indeed predicated on overstating the uniformity of clusters.
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5.2 Worldwide Cluster Distinctiveness
A second factor that may unintentionally precondition certain aspects of the racial interpreta-
tion is the ordering of population groups, which subtly foregrounds the appearance of distinct
and bounded continental clusters. The populations in Figure 1 are arranged in roughly an east-
moving direction from Africa through the Americas, presumably to highlight patterns asso-
ciated with major geographic boundaries (oceans, mountains) and to reﬂect the approximate
order of human colonization. The order of populations, unlike the ordering of individuals, is
an aspect of ﬁgure construction determined by the authors, and in fact some continental and
population groups are altered from their original order in the CEPH data (Rosenberg 2007b,
2). That reordering produces certain sharp divisions between clusters at the expense of softer,
more graded boundaries.
For instance, the Mozabites and Bedouins, with their signiﬁcant secondary orange col-
oration, are placed apart from the chieﬂy orange-colored African populations in the worldwide
sample:
This distance results from Rosenberg et al.’s own reordering. Cann et al. designate the Moz-
abites as a North African population, placing the group directly after the other (Sub-Saharan)
African groups and immediately before the three Middle Eastern groups. Following this orig-
inal ordering would thus have placed the Mozabites, followed by the Bedouins, Druze, and
Palestinians, immediately to the right of the other African groups. The eﬀect would have been
a clinal pattern, a slight gradient with the fringed orange of the Mozabites and Bedouins soft-
ening the boundary between orange and blue. Instead, by shifting the Mozabites to a Middle
Eastern aﬃliation (eliminating the North African designation) and placing that entire regional
grouping to the right of Europe, Figure 1 strands these groups in a sea of blue, diﬀusing the im-
pact of their secondary clustering patterns and obscuring the genetic similarity betweenMiddle
Eastern and African groups. Intentionally or not, this implicitly posits the Sahara as divisive
and encourages the perception of a sharp boundary on either side.
The placement of the Pakistani Kalash population is a secondminor example. As the authors
note, the group appears as its own, distinctively yellow, cluster atK=6. But atK=5 it is colored
mostly blue, unlike the other Central/South Asian groups, which share some membership with
the pink cluster dominant in the East Asian groups to the right:
The placement of the Kalash box at the far end of the Central/South Asia grouping therefore
produces a sharp boundary between the two Asian clusters, interrupting what would otherwise
appear as a fairly smooth blue-pink gradient at K=5. This placement derives from Rosenberg
 open access - ptpbio.org
wills: are clusters races? 16
et al.: Cann et al. locate the Kalash between the Burusho and Pathan groups, which are consid-
erably more blue than the Uygur andHan groups neighboring the Kalash in Figure 1. Retaining
the original order would therefore have preserved a smoother blue-pink gradient at both K=5
and K=6, with a lesser interruption of yellow at K=6.
In both cases, Rosenberg et al. decline to discuss the regional aﬃliations and placements of
populations, an omission that may lead a reader to infer stronger genetic boundaries between the
six clusters of Figure 1 than are actually present. This, in combination with the slight overstate-
ment of population homogeneity discussed above, may predispose a reader to see the clusters
as more uniform and more geographically determined than the data suggests. In the hands of
Wade, and to some degree Sesardic, this becomes magniﬁed into a full-ﬂedged argument for
geographical determinism.
5.3 Rhetorical Intensiﬁcation
The racial interpretation of Rosenberg et al. (2002) describes the study as producing indisputable
proof that its clusters adhere closely to sharply-deﬁned regional and continental boundaries. In
shifting toward a biological racial realist ontology,Wade in particular describes the inferred clus-
ters as isolated, uniform, and geographically determined at both the population and continental
levels.
At the population level, Wade represents groups as deﬁned by single and unique clusters,
particularly through exaggerating the article’s discussion of linguistic isolation. The original
authors posit language diﬀerences as one possible factor driving diﬀerentiation between groups:
for instance, the Pakistani Burusho population, “a linguistic isolate, largely separated from other
groups, although less clearly than the … Kalash” (2383). Wade misrepresents both the degree
and prevalence of this phenomenon, writing in generalizing terms that “Language is often an
isolating mechanism that deters intermarriage. The Burusho, a people of Pakistan who speak
a unique language, turn out also to be unlike their neighbors genetically” (98, emphasis mine).
Placing a normative emphasis on isolation, deterrence, and dissimilarity, Wade removes the
authors’ hedges and falsely implies a total uniqueness for the Burusho population. In reality,
Figure 2 reveals some overlap with neighboring clusters.
Moreover, Wade’s use of the adverb “often” suggests that such isolation extends to other
groups, an impression he reinforces with unwarranted extrapolation. The authors make no men-
tion of linguistic isolation in Africa, but Wade writes conﬁdently that:
Within races, the Rosenberg-Feldman study showed that diﬀerent ethnicities could
be recognized. Among Africans, it is easy to distinguish by their genomes the
Yoruba of Nigeria, the San (a click-speaking people of southern Africa) and the
Mbuti and Biaka pygmies. (98)
What Wade appears to mean by “easy to distinguish” is that these four groups are shaded four
distinctive colors in Figure 2: orange, green, blue, and red, respectively. There are two prob-
lems with this representation. First, it isolates the Yoruba, whose orange cluster membership is
nearly identical to their two (unmentioned) neighboring groups; it would thus not be possible
to “distinguish by their genomes” the Yoruba from the Bantu or Mandenka. Second, Wade’s
commentary entirely overlooks the signiﬁcant admixture of the Biaka Pygmy population as dis-
cussed in 5.1. In interpreting this group as colored solely red, he wrongly implies that these
populations are characterized by unique and uniform clusters.
At the worldwide level, Wade persistently implies a particularly rigid separation between
clusters, steadily minimizing discussion of clinal gradients in describing the ﬁve “main” clusters
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as sharply, geographically bounded. He repeatedly emphasizes the ﬁxedness of individuals and
populations, writing, for instance, that the study “conﬁrm[s] the remarkable extent to which
people throughout history have lived and died in the place where they were born” (98)—a nor-
mative claim apparently of his own invention. From here, Wade further conceptualizes genetic
ﬂow as a discrete process of “splitting oﬀ ” and “taking away” ancestral genes, phrasings that
foreclose the possibility of clinal distribution or admixture by framing the movement of alle-
les across continents as a series of clean breaks rather than a continuous blending (98). Wade
reemphasizes the separation of populations in discussing the two Asian regions, writing that
“several Central Asian ethnicities … are of mixed European and East Asian ancestry. This is
not a surprise, given the frequent movement of peoples to and fro across Central Asia” (98).
While he here admits the possibility of movement within continents, Wade refuses to describe
this region as clinally distributed, even though its groups demonstrate notably graded, stable
proportions of blue to pink. His phrasing rather emphasizes constancy of movement—a per-
manent ﬂux—rather than stable, graded admixture; he wants to see this region as bounded by
Asia on one side with Europe ﬁrmly on the other.
Wade thus attempts to use the study to buttress his views that individuals are sortable into
discrete clusters determined by linguistics and geography, that they stay in place with minimal
mixing, and that they adhere with few exceptions to continental boundaries. It is doubtful that
Wade would have been dissuaded had the authors drawnmore attention to the study’s placement
of individuals and populations, as I have suggested. Nevertheless, his arguments here do appear
to derive at least in part from the article’s slight and unaddressed overstatement of the uniformity
and distinctiveness of clustering patterns.
Sesardic engages less directly with these aspects of the original article; however, his treat-
ment of population genetics research in general forecloses the possibility of recognizing the
data’s heterogeneity and clines in the ﬁrst place. The section preceding his discussion of Rosen-
berg et al. (2002) is an extensive theoretical discussion of genetic classiﬁcation. Detailing Ed-
wards (2003) and others, it seeks to justify the validity of multi-variable approaches in sorting
individuals into their populations of origin. Sesardic emphasizes the “virtual certainty” (151) of
this process, which “approach[es] the limit of perfect accuracy” (151) and in which the wrong
group categorization is “spectacularly unlikely” (152) given enough loci.22 The problem is that
Sesardic uses this background to frame Rosenberg et al. (2002), falsely, as a comparable clas-
siﬁcation study designed to sort individuals into predeﬁned racial categories. This impression
is strengthened by his mention of the study’s unprecedented scale: the 1,056 individuals from
52 populations are the sole ﬁgures he furnishes, which after his theoretical discussion seem an
argument for the “virtual certainty” of the results. The study, of course, was not designed to
sort individuals into categories—it is of diﬀerent design and focus than the projects described
previously—but rather to detect a variable number of clusters as well as admixture. But Sesardic’s
framing cleverly precludes the recognition of gradients or admixed individuals. By the logic de-
veloped immediately before his discussion of the study, these patterns would simply be viewed as
artifacts or irregularities awaiting further resolution by yet more data. Indeed, his conﬂation of
Rosenberg et al.’s methods with those of later studies assessing self-reported heritage, discussed
in 6.2, furthers this impression.
Sesardic and Wade, clearly, do not fairly represent Rosenberg et al. in discussing the study.
Their misappropriations are rather shaped far more strongly by their personal commitments
to a biological racial realist ontology than by the article itself. As my analysis in this section
has shown, however, both writers to some extent beneﬁt from subtle overstatements of cluster
22Sesardic echoes Edwards (2003) on the aggregation of loci as clarifying, but whereas Edwards’ rea-
soning works against racial claims (Kaplan and Winther 2014, 1043–6), Sesardic’s furthers the reverse.
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uniformity and separation in the precursor article.
6 Correspondence
The ﬁnal component of Rosenberg et al.’s racial interpretation is (iii): asserting a direct mapping
between clusters and the ﬁve traditionally identiﬁed continental races, such that clusters become
proxies for generalizations about racial phenotypes. This section shows how the original article
relies on one particular, signiﬁcant word choice that is directly seized by Wade and Sesardic in
their unwarranted equation of clusters with races.
6.1 Correspondence
Theword “correspond” is a touchpoint in Rosenberg et al. (2002), describing the relationship be-
tween clusters and geographical or linguistic groupings. It is closely associated with the study’s
main objective: the authors note that the project was designed “to test the correspondence of
predeﬁned groups with those inferred from individual multilocus genotypes” (2381). Though
the authors describe varying degrees of correspondence in diﬀerent aspects of their analysis, the
word generally functions to aﬃrm the methods and utility of the clustering algorithm in detect-
ing meaningful population structure. While the term is used within an appropriate disciplinary
context, I argue that its particular implementation in this article somewhat overstates the degree
of the alignment between clusters and populations.
While the article often deploys this central verb with shades of meaning to describe relations
of varying strength, such nuances may be easily overlooked given the strength of the word’s as-
sociations. The authors occasionally seem to imply a one-to-one agreement, an equation rather
than association between cluster and population. The verb does denote a certain degree of equal-
ity, signifying both a general similarity (“to agree with”; “to be congruous or in harmony with”)
and a more precise physical alignment (“to answer or agree in regard to position, amount, etc.”)
(Oxford English Dictionary). Whereas the authors thus may generally rely on the word in the
ﬁrst sense, the second and stronger deﬁnition is also connoted, an implication that may unin-
tentionally deﬂect attention from individuals and populations that do not correspond perfectly
to inferred clusters.
For instance, they write in summary that “genetic clusters often corresponded closely to pre-
deﬁned regional or population groups or to collections of geographically and linguistically sim-
ilar populations” (2384). While the adverb “often” leaves room for some non-correspondence,
it also indicates a particular frequency and ﬁrmness, particularly in combination with “closely”
in this sentence. Likewise, the authors sometimes modify “correspond” with other strong in-
tensiﬁers such as “largely” (2382) and “mostly” (2384). Stronger verb synonyms also appear,
including match (used in the 2002 article and the 2005 follow-up study); and anchor, as in the
observation that at K=2 “the clusters were anchored by Africa and America,” the verb calling
to mind physical weight, heavy metal substances, and a rigid lack of motion (2382).23 For a
casual reader, these factors may combine with those discussed in previous sections to predispose
an overlooking of complexity, leading to an assumption of greater geographical and population
localization in the clusters than may actually be present.
In contrast, similar articles tend both to deﬁne “correspondence” as a metric and to note
deviations from observed correspondence, as can be seen in two papers cited by Rosenberg et
al. in support of their conclusions. Bowcock et al. (1994), which shows that microsatellite DNA
23“Anchor” functions as a conceptual metaphor (Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1980).
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analysis allows the construction of evolutionary trees that “reﬂect [individuals’] geographic ori-
gin with remarkable accuracy” (455), does occasionally describe the alignment of genetics and
origin using the verb “correspond,” but also uses more neutral verbs like “reﬂect,” “coincide,”
and “tend.” Further, these authors forthrightly quantify the extent to which individuals deviate
from the tree even though such deviations do not substantively detract from the main ﬁnding of
“remarkable accuracy.” Similarly, Mountain and Cavalli-Sforza (1997) assess the “consistency”
of an inferred tree corresponding to individuals’ population aﬃliations—in other words, they
deﬁne a metric that in turn deﬁnes the observed correspondence (705). Throughout, they detail
patterns of consistency and inconsistency, a discussion that (like Bowcock et al.’s) provides suﬃ-
cient acknowledgement of diﬀerence while not impeding the main claim that “most individuals
cluster with other members of their regional group” (705).
Rosenberg et al., unlike these precursors, rely almost exclusively on the word correspond, with-
out deﬁning or quantifying it, and decline to discuss deviations. They are, admittedly, working
within both an established disciplinary vocabulary and a limited space. Yet the features discussed
abovemay somewhat overstate the certainty of the ﬁndings, obscuring aspects of the data that do
not reﬂect the overall pattern of correspondence and increasing the risk of the paper’s language
being misappropriated—as happens, verbatim, in the racial interpretation.
6.2 Rhetorical Intensiﬁcation
Both of Rosenberg et al.’s racial interpreters base their hereditarian claims on overstating the
strength of correspondence between cluster and geography, emphasizing the strength of this
relationship to imply that a variety of phenotypic “racial” diﬀerences must follow. Both rely
heavily on the word “correspond,” using it disingenuously to conﬂate clusters with races.
Sesardic relies on the implied strength of the keyword “correspond” in mischaracterizing
the study as a race-proving ﬁnding. He begins his population genetics section by attacking
the concern that multivariate clustering analyses may produce distinct groupings that “do not
correspond to common-sense races at all” (153), a warning further developed in a quote drawn
from Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003): “While we argue that there likely are a variety of identiﬁable
and biologically meaningful races, these will not correspond to folk racial categories” (1161).
Sesardic’s framing, notably, thus twice establishes “correspondence” between clusters and races
as the issue at stake and a connection he wishes to prove. This maneuver subtly conditions his
discussion of Rosenberg et al. (2002), in which he emphasizes correspondence between clusters
and geography in an eﬀort to debunk the previously stated warnings:
Ironically, empirical knowledge about race and genetic[s] is advancing so fast that
Pigliucci’s and Kaplan’s prediction was already refuted while the article with their
bold claim was still in print. In an important paper that came out in Science at
the very end of 2002, a group of geneticists showed that the analysis of multilocus
genotypes of 1,056 individuals from 52 populations did allow an inference of group
structure and that, furthermore, ﬁve clusters derived from that analysis of purely
genetic similarities corresponded largely to major geographic regions (Rosenberg et
al. 2002). This is an important discovery that makes it much more diﬃcult than
before to claim that race is entirely disconnected from genetics. (153, emphasis
mine)
Despite claiming that this “important” study functions singlehandedly to “refute” the claim in
question, Sesardic reports few conclusions, merely pointing toward the correspondence between
clusters and geography. Yet he quickly concludes that these observations prove that race is
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not “entirely disconnected from genetics,” a conclusion that seems to rest on little more than a
misplaced idea of correspondence in presenting the relationship between cluster and geography
as so tight that it conﬁrms clusters-as-races in opposition to Pigliucci and Kaplan.
This careless substitution of one form of correspondence for another typiﬁes a larger pat-
tern in which Sesardic relies on “correspondence” to falsely imply that the study inquires into
self-reported ancestry. His argument next turns to critics who have “attempt[ed] to downplay
the importance of the results” by suggesting that its worldwide clusters “only loosely correspond
to social categories of race” (153)—again establishing “correspondence” as the point of con-
tention. Sesardic’s answer is Tang et al. (2005), a study of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent design that
found a strong correlation between genetic clusters and self-identiﬁed race/ethnicity (SIRE)
groups. Sesardic eagerly highlights the authors’ description of “near perfect correspondence” be-
tween clusters and SIRE and their observation that “the correspondence between genetic cluster
and [SIRE] is remarkably high … eﬀectively synonymous” (Tang 2005, 268, 271, emphasis
mine). Aside from the unremarked fact that SIRE is not necessarily synonymous with social
categories of race as Sesardic implies, it is troubling that this elision of studies—as brokered
by the repetition of “correspond”—is an attempt to misrepresent the later study as a reﬁne-
ment of Rosenberg et al.’s, implying that the earlier paper was always, in fact, about “race.”
Sesardic essentially uses Tang et al.’s 99.9% correspondence to justify the designation of any
non-corresponding data in the ﬁrst study as irrelevant, resolved by the “near-perfect study” that
followed. Again, Sesardic’s rhetoric depends crucially on an abuse of the strong sense of the
word “correspond,” conﬂating geography and race without warrant. To be clear, there is little
that Rosenberg et al. might have done to prevent this, although varying their word choice and
more openly addressing areas of non-correspondence might have made Sesardic’s tricks more
diﬃcult, or at least more obvious.
In the larger context of Sesardic’s article, the suggestion that population genetics research
nearly perfectly detects an individual’s racial and geographical origin grounds his ultimate ges-
tures toward hereditarianism. Hochman (2016, 67) correctly notes that the article does not
overtly make hereditarian claims, though it dangerously suggests them. Sesardic’s subsequent
section discussesmorphological racial characteristics, arguing that race is unmistakably inscribed
on the body and that the multiplication of racial traits leads to an “objective biological classiﬁ-
cation” (156); the logical step linking this certainty to genetic determinism is implied, if not
directly stated, by the previous section. Psychological diﬀerences, like IQ, Sesardic also wishes
to see as non-arbitrarily related to genetics; again, following from his overblown discussion of
population genetics, this would seem to leave little room for anything other than a hereditarian
stance. So perfect is the match—the correspondence—between geography, genetics, and race
that other attributes must surely follow.
Wade’s overt hereditarianism likewise depends on an inﬂated assessment of the “correspon-
dence” described by Rosenberg et al. Like Sesardic, he champions the study’s ﬁnding that the
worldwide clusters “correspond[ed] to the ﬁve continental races” (2014, 98), but in a formu-
lation that eliminates the more cautious phrasings of the original. Elsewhere, he capitalizes
on the authors’ keyword, intensifying it to suggest that in studies like this one, “everyone ends
up in the cluster with which they share the most variation in common. These clusters always
correspond to the ﬁve continental races” (96). His tone of absolute certainty implies a doubly
perfect correspondence: of genetics to individual origin, and of clusters to races. While these
implications are clearly exaggerated, they would appear to be enabled to some degree by the
original authors’ language of matching and anchoring, extrapolated into a vision of inevitable,
perfect alignment. “Correspond” seems an irresistible verb for a writer already prone to claims
of geographical determinism.
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Like Sesardic, Wade ampliﬁes this implied cluster-race correspondence by mischaracter-
izing the study as continuous with others investigating self-reported ancestry. He introduces
Rosenberg et al. (2002) by referencing an out-of-context excerpt fromRisch et al. (2002), which
states that numerous population genetics studies have “eﬀectively … recapitulated the classical
deﬁnition of races based on continental ancestry” (3). That article in fact has nothing to say about
social deﬁnitions of race, focusing rather on the utility of self-deﬁned ancestry for biomedical
applications. Yet Wade transitions immediately from here to Rosenberg et al. (2002), mislead-
ingly framing it as “one of these more sophisticated studies” referenced by Risch et al. (who
never discuss it). Borrowing the strong connotations of Risch et al.’s phrase thus enables Wade
to imbue Rosenberg et al.’s mention of “correspondence” with a larger signiﬁcance than it is
accorded in the actual article. Wade’s sly insertion of a passing remark about “races based on
continental ancestry” thus frames Rosenberg et al.’s observations about continental origin as
having something to say about race rather than simply about genetic clusters. From here, Wade
guides the reader through subsequent studies that are, in turn, falsely presented as validating the
race-proving status of Rosenberg et al. (2002). His population genetics discussion ultimately
descends, far more fully than Sesardic’s, to an elaboration of his hereditarian agenda. Wade’s
hereditarianism depends centrally on a view of races as genetically inscribed and—as his mis-
representation of population genomics research suggests—detectible in the “correspondence”
between cluster and geography, which is but a proxy for cluster and race.
I do not mean to imply thatWade’s many misleading statements follow entirely fromRosen-
berg et al.’s preference for the word “correspond.” Softer language and attention to areas of
non-correspondence would certainly not deter such a motivated interpreter. His statements,
however, do depend at least partly on the overwrought signiﬁcance he attaches to the study’s
use of “correspondence,” some of which is subtly suggested in the article itself.
7 Conclusion
This essay has endeavored to show how small details of “Genetic Structure of Human Popula-
tions”—the structuring of ﬁgures, particular phrasings—have been misappropriated and trans-
formed in its racial interpretation, with Sesardic and Wade seizing on these to force a shift
from the article’s bio-genomic cluster realism to their own biological racial realisms. My obser-
vations are not an accusation of carelessness, nor of any implicit racialized thinking on the part
of the researchers. Rather, I suggest that these features arise chieﬂy from the constraints and
conventions of scientiﬁc publishing. Rosenberg et al. (2002) is a slim three pages in length, an
extremely compressed space in which to discuss the study’s limitations or exceptions to its major
ﬁndings. Certainly, the verbal and visual features I have discussed are generally consistent with
the article’s scholarly context and appropriate to its primary audience of other researchers. The
authors, indeed, take pains to project neutrality in their writing. The article is mute on matters
of race, impartially recorded, and is neither careless nor inﬂammatory in tone.
The problem of the article’s recurring racial interpretation stems more from its secondary,
nonscientiﬁc audience. Writers like Sesardic and Wade are clearly irresponsible in their misuse
of the paper, misrepresenting its methods and overstating its ﬁndings to advance their personal
agendas. Still, it is worth asking how the article itself may have more fully prevented such
interpretations from arising. There is of course a need for robust disavowals and correctives as
to the paper’s scope, which many critics of Sesardic andWade have undertaken. But it must also
be recognized that other, non-specialist audiences exist, and that these are especially susceptible
to misunderstandings arising from the sorts of subtle ambiguities I have detailed above. A series
of small reﬁnements might collectively have aided in the more accurate rendering of the article
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in subsequent debates beyond the boundaries of science: drawing attention to aspects of ﬁgure
construction, noting deviations from the dominant patterns, and deﬁning key terms.
Admittedly, small reﬁnements can only accomplish so much, and it is unlikely that the
authors could ever fully block motivated writers like Sesardic and Wade. Nevertheless, it is
incumbent upon the researchers—particularly in a ﬁeld so loaded with pop-cultural signiﬁcance
as the genetics of race—to write with consideration of these secondary audiences. Faith in
scientiﬁc objectivity can only carry so far in this context. Population genetics research, perhaps
more than other ﬁelds, stands to be distorted and misrepresented in the service of arguments
like the ones I have detailed in this essay. Excruciatingly precise language and a transparent
disavowal of potential misinterpretations are necessary, even where scientists may deem these
to be obvious or unworthy of accommodation. They are necessary because of the nature of this
work, which is misreported because it is of high stakes to the wider culture: wittingly or not,
it interfaces with some of our most entrenched and most dangerous assumptions about how
people relate to one another, genetically, culturally, and politically.
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